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Abstract
The empirical evidence on nominal exchange rate dynamics shows a long-run re-
lationship of this variable with the fundamentals of the economy, although such re-
lationship disappears at shorter horizons (“exchange rate disconnect” puzzle). This
apparently contrasting behaviour of the nominal exchange rate can be explained in an
overlapping-generations model where the two currencies are not perfect substitutes. In
this framework, we show that the nominal exchange rate is pinned down by the fun-
damentals of the economy at the monetary steady state. However, fluctuations of the
nominal exchange rate around its long-run value, which are not driven by shocks to
fundamentals, can emerge. Firstly, we prove the existence of endogenous (determinis-
tic) business cycles in the nominal exchange rate. Secondly, we construct stationary
sunspot equilibria where random fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate arise as a
result of self-fulfilling beliefs.
∗E-mail: mauro.bambi@york.ac.uk
†E-mail: sara.eugeni@durham.ac.uk
1 Introduction
Friedman (1953) famously argued that “a flexible exchange rate need not be
an unstable exchange rate. If it is, it is primarily because there is underly-
ing instability in the economic conditions governing international trade.” In
other words, Friedman’s view was that the exchange rate volatility that we
observe between any two currencies is just a symptom of the volatility of the
fundamentals of the underlying economies. However, the notion that there is a
strong correlation between exchange rates and fundamentals has been widely
questioned over the years.
The main lesson that can be drawn from the empirical literature is that
while there is evidence that the long-run value of the exchange rate is somewhat
tied to fundamentals, it is very difficult to understand and predict its behaviour
at shorter horizons.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) coined the term “exchange rate disconnect” to
describe the “exceedingly weak relationship (except, perhaps, in the long run)
between the exchange rate and virtually any macroeconomic aggregates”. One
of the manifestations of this puzzle is that economic models are no more useful
than a simple random walk model in forecasting the nominal exchange rate,
as seen in the seminal paper of Meese et al. (1983).1 On the other hand,
Mark (1995) has shown that econometricians have more success in forecast-
ing the nominal exchange rate at longer horizons. Moreover, Groen (2000),
Mark et al. (2001), Rapach et al. (2002) and Cerra et al. (2010) have all
documented the existence of a long-run relationship between exchange rates
and monetary fundamentals, such as money supplies and output differentials,
using cointegration analysis.
Any macroeconomic model that wishes to capture this puzzling dynamics of
the nominal exchange rate should therefore have two main properties: on the
one hand, the nominal exchange rate should be a function of the fundamentals
at the steady state of the economy; at the same time, there should also exist
equilibria where the nominal exchange rate fluctuates around its long-run value
but not as a result of randomness in the fundamentals of the economy. The
aim of this paper is to propose a model which possesses these two features.
In fact, in the main workhorse monetary open economy models under flexible
(Lucas, 1982) and sticky prices (Obstfeld et al., 1995), the nominal exchange
rate is a function of the fundamentals both in the short and in the long-run.
The most popular framework to study fundamentals-unrelated fluctuations
in monetary, closed economies is the overlapping-generations model. The ex-
istence of sunspot equilibria and endogenous business cycles has been studied
1Meese et al.’s paper has inspired dozens of empirical studies on the topic. In a recent review of the
literature, Rossi (2013) pointed out that the puzzle is still very much alive.
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in two-period overlapping-generations economies with one currency and one
good in the well-known seminal contributions of respectively Azariadis (1981)
and Grandmont (1985), where Azariadis et al. (1986) explored the connections
between sunspots and cycles.2 However, the investigation of endogenous fluc-
tuations and sunspot equilibria in monetary, open economies has proved elusive
so far due to Kareken and Wallace (1981)’s result on the indeterminacy of the
nominal exchange rate. In their paper, one good is available for consumption
purposes and overlapping generations of agents can store two currencies to buy
the good when old. However, as the currencies are perfectly substitutable, the
nominal exchange rate is indeterminate as well as constant over time.3 For
this reason, the model cannot replicate the previously mentioned stylized facts
on exchange rate dynamics.
In this paper, we study a two-country, two-goods and two-currencies over-
lapping generations economy where agents live for two periods. The timing
of trading is structured as follows. The first period of life of each cohort is
rather standard. The young are endowed with a country-specific good and af-
ter having chosen the optimal consumption bundle for the current period, they
choose a portfolio of currencies to fund consumption next period4. The main
novelties of our model lie in the way the old can use their portfolio of curren-
cies and their access to currency markets. Firstly, we depart from Kareken et
al. (1981)’s assumption that the domestic and the foreign currency are perfect
substitutes. We assume instead that each currency can only buy the country-
specific good as in Lucas (1982). However, we show that this feature alone is
not enough to bypass the issue of a constant and indeterminate exchange rate
in our model, as the two currencies would still be perfect substitutes as stores
of value.5 Then, we also require that the old have no access to the currency
markets, in the sense that they cannot re-trade their portfolio of currencies
purchased when young once they are old. In other words, they have to commit
to the money holdings acquired in the previous period.
We show that these two features imply that agents’ portfolios can be pinned
down as a result of agents’ future demand for the two goods. As a consequence,
the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate is tightly linked to the dynamics of
the prices of the two goods. For instance, if the domestic good is expected to
2The literature has also shown that the existence of endogenous cycles is not an exclusive feature of two-
period overlapping-generations models. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) has shown the existence of two-period
cycles in a model where agents live for three periods, while Reichlin (1992) has proved the existence of
periodic cycles in a model with longer but uncertain lifetime spans.
3Sargent (1987) has pointed out that Kareken and Wallace’s indeterminacy result is related to the presence
of an extra asset in the model, and not specifically due to the demographic structure.
4The assumption that agents are only endowed with a country-specific good is only made to simplify
the notation. Allowing partial instead of complete specialization would not change our main results. We
also restrict our attention to “Samuelsonian economies”, where the value of the endowment when old is
sufficiently small to generate a positive demand for money (Gale, 1973).
5The interested reader will find further details on this issue in the Supplementary Material.
2
be more expensive in the following period, the domestic currency has a lower
purchasing power. If the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently high, then this
implies a lower global demand for the domestic currency and an exchange rate
depreciation.
One of the difficulties of our framework is that its dynamical system is much
more complex than in the case of a one-good, one-currency economy. Stan-
dard geometric tools which have been extensively used to study the properties
of monetary economies with overlapping-generations, such as the offer curve,
cannot be easily adapted to a two-goods, two-currencies framework6. However,
we show that for a CES utility function which is additively separable across
the two goods (as well as intertemporally separable), the dynamics of the two
goods’ prices can be studied independently. As a result, the dynamic behaviour
of the world economy can be fully characterized by i) two separate difference
equations in the two prices; ii) an equation for the nominal exchange rate,
which is pinned down by the expected prices of the two goods, and finally iii)
two dynamic inequality constraints in the price of both goods and the nominal
exchange rate, which guarantee positive demand of the two currencies.
In this context, we prove that the nominal exchange rate is determined by
the fundamentals of the economy at the monetary steady state. Two among
the determinants of the exchange rate, relative money supplies and aggregate
endowments, are common to other monetary models of exchange rate determi-
nacy (e.g. Frankel, 1979; Lucas, 1982). In our setting, the nominal exchange
rate also depends on how much of each good is saved by the young, as cur-
rencies serve the function of stores of value. In particular, higher savings of a
particular good are associated with an appreciation of the domestic currency.
As the supply of a good by the young increases, its price falls and hence the
purchasing power of the domestic currency in units of the domestic good in-
creases. As the domestic currency is worth more, then its demand increases
hence the appreciation in equilibrium. We also show that Lucas’ exchange
rate equation can be retrieved by imposing that the endowment of the old is
zero. Crucially, this equivalence only holds in the long-run, as exchange rate
and fundamentals are disconnected outside the monetary steady state in our
framework.
We then demonstrate that our model is able to explain why econometricians
struggle to find a strong correlation between the exchange rate and the funda-
mentals of the economy at shorter horizons. We prove that randomness in the
fundamentals is not required to generate exchange rate fluctuations around
the steady state. Persistent endogenous fluctuations in the exchange rate can
indeed emerge either as a consequence of periodic deterministic cycles or as a
result of sunspot equilibria once extrinsic uncertainty is added to the model.
6See Woodford (1984) for a literature review of one-good, one-currency OLG economies.
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Under conditions on preferences which are alike to the one-good one-currency
case, periodic deterministic cycles may exist for an open set of the endowments.
We show that one can construct many possible scenarios each of which can give
rise to a cyclical behaviour of the nominal exchange rate around its long-run
value. In particular, we provide an example where the endowment of one of
the two countries is such that the domestic price is determinate while the other
one is such that a two-period cycle emerge. This results in a two-period cycle
of the nominal exchange rate. Alternatively, one could suppose that one of the
two prices has cyclical behaviour while the other price is indeterminate. In
this case, the path of the nominal exchange rate is indeterminate but would
always converge to a two-period cycle. Another example would be one where
both prices exhibit cyclical behaviour. Depending on the initial prices selected,
the two values that the exchange rate can assume in the cycle will be differ-
ent. Only under very special circumstances, the nominal exchange rate can
be constant over time: this is only possible when the fundamentals of the two
economies, as well as the initial price levels, are identical.
Nominal exchange rate fluctuations can also emerge as a result of station-
ary sunspot equilibria. In fact, we prove that, under some conditions, the
randomness of the nominal exchange rate that we observe in the data can be
generated by self-fulfilling beliefs that prices are stochastic.
As Azariadis et al. (1986) argued, focusing on stationarity sunspot equi-
libria is important for two reasons: firstly, because stable beliefs can be the
asymptotic outcome of learning processes; secondly, this is a first step towards
understanding dynamical sunspot behaviour. In a one-currency one-good econ-
omy, Azariadis (1981) showed that sufficient conditions for the existence of sta-
tionary sunspot equilibria are the complementarity between consumption and
leisure and the local stability (indeterminacy) of the monetary steady state.
In our framework, we prove that if similar conditions hold, then stationary
sunspot equilibria exist. It is enough that agents believe that the price of one
of the two goods fluctuates over time. If agents believe that the real inter-
est rate in one country (measured as the change over time in the purchasing
power of the domestic currency in units of the domestic good) is subject to
some degree of volatility, then the nominal exchange rate follows a stochastic
process merely dictated by such beliefs. In particular, an increase in the real
interest rate is associated with the appreciation of the domestic currency and
viceversa.
Interestingly, we do not need any heterogeneity across agents to generate
these fundamentals-unrelated fluctuations, as sunspot equilibria are supported
by agents’ sharing the same beliefs. On the contrary, recent contributions in
the literature have attempted to explain the exchange rate disconnect puz-
zle assuming that private investors possess heterogeneous information about
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the fundamentals of the economy7. In such setting, a common information
framework would not be able to explain the puzzle.
This paper shows that it is then possible to construct equilibria which repli-
cate the two main features of the dynamics of the nominal exchange rates:
while our model can easily rationalise the “exchange rate disconnect” puzzle,
empirical evidence which points at the higher predictability of the nominal
exchange rate in the long-run can also be reconciled within this framework.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we describe the model and
show how the dynamic equilibrium system can be simplified. We characterise
the monetary steady state in section 3 and the dynamics around the monetary
steady state in section 4. In section 5, we investigate the existence of non-
fundamentals related persistent fluctuations: endogenous deterministic cycles
and stationary sunspot equilibria. Section 6 concludes. All the proofs can be
found in Appendix B.
2 The model
We study the following two-country pure exchange overlapping-generations
economy. Time is discrete and a generic date is indicated with t. At each t, an
agent is born in each country with a two-period lifetime, where a = 1, 2 refers
to age. We indicate with h = 1, 2 the agent living in country h while ` = 1, 2
refers to the good or the currency. For instance, c`ah,t is the consumption of
good ` of the agent born in country h in period of life a at time t. Agents
are endowed with a country-specific good in both periods of life: agents born
in country 1 (2) are endowed with good 1 (2). Since our objective is to show
that there can exist fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate not related to
fluctuations in the fundamentals, we assume that endowments are stationary.
Hence, (y1a1, y
2
a1) = (y
1
a, 0) and (y
1
a2, y
2
a2) = (0, y
2
a) for every a.
There also exists a generation that lives only in period 0. These agents
are “the old” at time 0 and are endowed with some units of the domestic
currency and the domestic good. The total endowment of the two currencies
is indicated with M1 and M2 and the monetary authorities are inactive in the
following periods. As in standard overlapping-generations economies, money
is demanded by the young to transfer wealth across periods as long as there
is a motive for saving. We indicate with m`h,t the demand of currency ` of the
(young) agent born in country h at time t.
An agent born in country h chooses consumption allocations c1h,t := (c
1
1h,t, c
2
1h,t),
c2h,t+1 := (c
1
2h,t+1, c
2
2h,t+1) and a portfolio allocation mh,t := (m
1
h,t,m
2
h,t) to
7We refer to the “microstructure” literature by Evans et al. (2002), Bacchetta et al. (2006) and Evans
(2010).
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maximise her intertemporal utility function:
maxc1h,t,c2h,t+1,mh,t
c11h,t
1− 1σ
1− 1
σ
+
c21h,t
1− 1σ
1− 1
σ
+ β
[
c12h,t+1
1− 1σ
1− 1
σ
+
c22h,t+1
1− 1σ
1− 1
σ
]
(1)
s.t. p1t c
1
1h,t + p
2
t etc
2
1h,t +m
1
h,t + etm
2
h,t = w1h,t, (2)
p1t+1(c
1
2h,t+1 − y12h) = m1h,t, (3)
p2t+1(c
2
2h,t+1 − y22h) = m2h,t, (4)
where σ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution and β ∈ (0, 1] is the discount
factor8. We indicate with p`t the price of good ` in units of the domestic
currency and with et the nominal exchange rate or the price of currency 2 in
units of currency 1, where the latter is the nume´raire currency. Since agents
are only endowed with a country-specific good, the wealth of the two agents
when young is respectively w11,t := p
1
ty
1
1 and w12,t := p
2
t ety
2
1.
The budget constraint of the young is rather standard: each agent uses
her wealth to buy the two consumption goods and a portfolio of currencies.
The novelty of our model with respect to Kareken et al. (1981) is that the
two currencies are not perfect substitutes, in the sense that each of them
cannot be used to buy any good. Firstly, we assume that currency 1 (2)
can only buy good 1 (2). In addition, the old are not allowed to re-adjust
their portfolio composition before spending the currencies in the respective
goods’ markets. These two features jointly ensure that the two currencies
are not perfect substitutes as stores of value, in contrast with Kareken et al.
(1981)9. As the old face two separate budget constraints, the two currencies
have different rates of return which depend on the expected purchasing power
of the two currencies. As a result, both the nominal exchange rate as well as
the agents’ portfolios can be pinned down in equilibrium.
Let λ1h,t be the Lagrange multiplier associated to (2) while λ
1
2h,t+1 and
λ22h,t+1 are the multipliers associated to the budget constraint of the old (3)
and (4). The Lagrangian function of agent h born at time t is:10
L =
c11h,t
1− 1
σ
1− 1
σ
+
c21h,t
1− 1
σ
1− 1
σ
+ β
[
c12h,t+1
1− 1
σ
1− 1
σ
+
c22h,t+1
1− 1
σ
1− 1
σ
]
+
+ λ1h,t
[
w1h,t − p1t c11h,t − p2t etc21h,t −m1h,t − etm2h,t
]
+
+
∑
`
λ`2h,t+1
[
m`h,t − p`t+1(c`2h,t+1 − y`2h)
]
(5)
8This utility function implies that preferences across the two goods are separable. We adopt this speci-
fication for tractability reasons, since we can study analytically the dynamics around the monetary steady
state (see section 3). We also assume that agents assign the same weight to the domestic and the foreign
good to make notation less cumbersome, but our main results hold if home bias is allowed.
9See the Supplementary material for more details on the point that both ingredients are necessary.
10Since we are interested in studying fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate around the monetary
steady state, we only study equilibria where money holdings are strictly positive.
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The first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient for a maximum and can
be found in Appendix A. Rearranging the first-order conditions, it can be
shown that the optimal demand for the two currencies is:11
m11,t =
βσp1t+1
1−σ
p1ty
1
1 − p1t+1y12 [p1t 1−σ + (p2t et)1−σ + βσ(p2t+1et)1−σ]
At
(6)
m21,t =
βσ(p2t+1et)
1−σ[p1ty
1
1 + p
1
t+1y
1
2 ]
etAt
(7)
m12,t =
βσp1t+1
1−σ
[p2t ety
2
1 + p
2
t+1ety
2
2 ]
At
(8)
m22,t =
βσ(p2t+1et)
1−σp2t ety
2
1 − p2t+1ety22 [p1t 1−σ + (p2t et)1−σ + βσp1t+11−σ]
etAt
(9)
where At ≡ p1t 1−σ + (p2t et)1−σ + βσp1t+11−σ + βσ(etp2t+1)1−σ.
It can be noticed that agents’ demand for the foreign currency is always
positive, since they are not endowed with the foreign good. The holdings of
the domestic currency are instead positive as long as the numerators of (6)
and (9) are strictly positive. In particular, we have that
m11,t > 0 ⇔
βσp1t
σ
y11
p1t+1
σ
y12
> 1 +
(
p2t et
p1t
)1−σ
+ βσ
(
p2t+1et
p1t
)1−σ
(10)
m22,t > 0 ⇔
βσp2t
σ
y21
p2t+1
σ
y22
> 1 +
(
p1t
p2t et
)1−σ
+ βσ
(
p1t+1
p2t et
)1−σ
(11)
Since the right hand side of both equations is greater than one, it follows
that a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for money holdings of the do-
mestic currency to be positive in each country, is:
βσp`t
σ
y`1 > p
`
t+1
σ
y`2 ` = 1, 2 (12)
The value of the endowment when old must be sufficiently small as compared
to the value of the endowment when young, i.e. the economy must be Samuel-
sonian (Gale, 1973). However, equations (10) and (11) are more stringent than
the standard Samuelsonian condition. In fact, the demand for the domestic
currency will also depend on the demand for the foreign good in the two peri-
ods. In particular, a higher price of the foreign good leads to a higher (lower)
demand for the domestic good (and hence for the domestic currency) if the
elasticity of substitution is higher (lower) than one.
Next, we plug (6), (7), (8) and (9) into the budget constraints and derive
11We show the main steps in the Supplementary Material.
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the optimal demands for the goods:
c11h,t =
p1t
−σ
At
wh,t, c
2
1h,t =
(etp
2
t )
−σ
At
wh,t, (13)
c12h,t+1 =
βσp1t+1
−σ
At
wh,t, c
2
2h,t+1 =
βσ(etp
2
t+1)
−σ
At
wh,t (14)
where w1,t ≡ p1ty11 + p1t+1y12 and w2,t = p2t ety21 + p2t+1ety22.
Finally, we introduce the maximization problem of the initial old. The
initial old is endowed with some units of the domestic currency and of the
domestic good. To simplify the problem, we assume that the initial old gain
utility only from the domestic good.12 In country 1:
max
c121,0
c121,0
1− 1
σ
1− 1
σ
(15)
subject to:
p10(c
1
21,0 − y121) = M1 (16)
The solution is straightforward:
c121,0 =
M1
p10
+ y121 (17)
(18)
The maximisation problem of the initial old in country 2 is similar. Its solution
requires that the old agent in country 2 consumes its domestic endowment plus
the real money balances:
c222,0 =
M2
p20
+ y222 (19)
2.1 Equilibrium
We are now ready to give a definition of monetary equilibrium.
Definition 1 A monetary equilibrium is any sequence of strictly positive nom-
inal prices and exchange rates, {p1t , p2t , et}∞t=0, a strictly positive consumption
allocation, {c1ah,t, c2ah,t}∞t=0 for every a, h, and a strictly positive portfolio allo-
cation, {m1h,t,m2h,t}∞t=0 for every h, such that:
(i) Each agent h maximises her utility subject to her constraints at any t.
(ii) Goods’ markets clear, i.e.,
∑
h c
`
1h,t +
∑
h c
`
2h,t = y
`
1 + y
`
2 ∀ `, t.
(iii) Money markets clear, i.e.,
∑
hm
`
h,t = M
` ∀ `, t.
12If we assumed that the initial old gained utility from both goods, we would need to assume that he is
endowed with some units of the foreign good (given our utility function). We avoid this to ensure consistency
with the pattern of endowments of future generations. Assuming that every generation is endowed with some
units of the foreign good would considerably complicate the notation but not change our results.
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In the next Proposition, we derive the key equations that any monetary
equilibrium must satisfy.
Proposition 1 The dynamics of the world economy is fully described by the
system:
βσp1t+1
1−σ
[p1ty
1
1 −M1] = p1t 1−σ[M1 + p1t+1y12] (20)
βσp2t+1
1−σ
[p2ty
2
1 −M2] = p2t 1−σ[M2 + p2t+1y22] (21)
et =
(
M1 + p1t+1y
1
2
M2 + p2t+1y
2
2
) 1
σ
(
p2t+1
p1t+1
) 1−σ
σ
(22)
where p1t > 0, p
2
t > 0 for any t ≥ 0, plus the inequality constraints (10) and
(11), which guarantee strictly positive money demands.
The first observation is that the dynamics of the prices of the two goods
can be studied independently from each other13. However, the system does not
dichotomizes completely. The dynamic inequality constraints (10) and (11),
which have to be respected, link the prices of the two goods together.
In the analysis of the dynamics of the economy, we will proceed by studying
first the price sequences emerging from the system (20)-(21) and then verify
numerically that the inequality constraints hold for any t.
Equation (22) shows that the behaviour of the nominal exchange rate is
driven by two different channels. Firstly, it depends on the endowment when
old of the agents. Suppose that agents born in country 1 have a higher en-
dowment when old. Everything else equal, they would need to acquire less
domestic currency when young to achieve their desired level of consumption.
A lower demand for currency 1 implies a depreciation (et increases).
The nominal exchange rate also responds to movements in future price
levels. The next result summarizes the effects of changes in future price levels
on the nominal exchange rate.
Corollary 1 If σ > 1, then an increase (decrease) in the expected price of the
domestic good leads to a currency depreciation (appreciation). If σ < 1, then
the impact of a price change on the exchange rate is ambiguous.
In Appendix B, we show that price changes can have an effect on the nom-
inal exchange rate through two separate components. Suppose that the price
of good 2 goes up. Firstly, this generates a wealth effect: as the value of
the endowment of good 2 when old increases, agents need to accumulate less
currency 2 and a lower demand for the currency 2 leads to a depreciation (et
13This result depends on the fact that preferences across the two goods are separable. If we changed the
utility function to a CES aggregator of the kind cah,t =
[
c1ah,t
σ−1
σ + c2ah,t
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
, the dynamics of the
two goods would be interdependent and the system cannot be solved in blocks.
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falls). But there is also a price effect: when σ > 1, goods are substitutes
which means that an increase in the price of good 2 in the future implies that
agents demand less good 2 in favour of good 1. Agents would then demand
less currency 2, which also adds to the depreciation of currency 2. Therefore,
when σ > 1, the price channel always reinforces the wealth channel. When
σ < 1, then the price channel works in the opposite direction as goods are
complements. Hence, the overall effect of an increase in the price of good 2 is
ambiguous when σ < 114.
3 The monetary steady state: long-run determinants of
the nominal exchange rate
Firstly, let us define the growth rates of the nominal price levels and the terms
of trade of the economy respectively as: pi`t ≡ p
`
t+1
p`t
− 1 and εt ≡ p
2
t et
p1t
.
From now onwards, we star steady state variables. At the steady state, the
nominal price levels must grow at a constant rate: pi1t = pi
1∗ and pi2t = pi
2∗.
Combining the first-order conditions (37) and (38) and imposing stationarity
in consumption, it can also be observed that εt = ε
∗. It then follows that
the nominal exchange rate grows at a constant rate at the steady state of the
economy:
et+1
et
=
1 + pi1∗
1 + pi2∗
(23)
Definition 2 A monetary steady state is any monetary equilibrium with strictly
positive prices (p1∗t , p
2∗
t , e
∗
t ), inflation rates (pi
1∗, pi2∗), and strictly positive and
constant consumption allocations (c1∗ah, c
2∗
ah) for every a, h.
The next Proposition shows that, at a stationary monetary equilibrium,
inflation rates are equal to zero in both countries. This also implies that
the nominal exchange rate is constant. Moreover, it shows that a stationary
monetary equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proposition 2 At a stationary monetary equilibrium, we have that:
(p1∗t , p
2∗
t , e
∗
t ) =
(
M1(1 + βσ)
βσy11 − y12
,
M2(1 + βσ)
βσy21 − y22
,
M1
M2
βσy21 − y22
βσy11 − y12
(
y11 + y
1
2
y21 + y
2
2
) 1
σ
)
(24)
and the two inequality constraints (10) and (11) become
βσy11
y21
> 1 + (1 + βσ)ε∗1−σ, and
βσy21
y22
> 1 + (1 + βσ)ε∗σ−1 (25)
14Notice that when σ = 1 (log utility), the nominal exchange rate responds to movements of price levels
only through the wealth channel. On the other hand, when the endowments of the old are equal to zero,
only the price channel matters.
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At the steady state of the economy, the nominal exchange rate is deter-
minate and a function of the fundamentals of the economy. In particular, it
depends on three different sets of parameters: (1) relative money supplies; (2)
relative savings; (3) relative aggregate endowments or the terms of trade of
the economy:
e∗ =
M1
M2︸︷︷︸
relative money supply
· β
σy21 − y22
βσy11 − y12︸ ︷︷ ︸
relative savings
·
(
y11 + y
1
2
y21 + y
2
2
) 1
σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
terms of trade
For instance, currency 1 depreciates (e increases) under the following circum-
stances: (1) an increase in the domestic money supply; (2) a fall in savings in
good 1; (3) an increase in the domestic aggregate endowment. The first chan-
nel does not probably need an explanation. The second channel involves the
relative savings by the young in the two goods. In fact, aggregating the budget
constraint of the old across agents, we obtain an equation for the savings of
good 1:
p1∗(c12−y12) = M1 ⇒ p1∗(y11−c11) = M1 ⇒ y11−c11 =
βσy11 − y12
1 + βσ
where p1∗ is known from Proposition 2. It can be observed that a fall in the
supply of savings of good 1 implies a higher price for the good. Since currency
1 in units of the domestic good is worth less in terms of purchasing power,
then it depreciates15. Finally, an increase in the aggregate endowment of good
1 implies a depreciation of the domestic currency as the relative price of good
1 falls (i.e. the terms of trade worsens):
ε∗ =
(
y11 + y
1
2
y21 + y
2
2
) 1
σ
(26)
It is worth observing that the second channel is specific to our OLG model.
In cash-in-advance infinite horizon models a` la Lucas (1982), the equilibrium
exchange rate is instead equal to:
e∗ =
M1
y1
y2
M2︸ ︷︷ ︸
quantity theory equations
·
(
y1
y2
) 1
σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
terms of trade
=
M1
M2
(
y1
y2
) 1−σ
σ
which can be seen as a specific case of our equation when y`2 = 0. In this case,
the young hold all the aggregate output of the economy. As in Lucas (1982),
an increase in the endowment leads to a currency appreciation (depreciation)
whenever the elasticity of substitution is higher (lower) than 1.
15Notice that savings can fall due to the following reasons: a fall in the endowment when young, an
increase in the endowment when old or a fall in the discount factor.
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More generally, the nominal exchange rate depends on the distribution of
the aggregate endowment across cohorts. Let us calculate the partial deriva-
tives of e∗ with respect to y21 and y
2
2 to gain some more intuition about the
effect of an increase in endowments on the exchange rate:
∂e∗
∂y21
=
M1
M2
1
βσy11 − y12
(
y11 + y
1
2
y21 + y
2
2
) 1
σ
[
βσ − β
σy21 − y22
σ(y11 + y
2
2)
]
∂e∗
∂y22
= −M
1
M2
1
βσy11 − y12
(
y11 + y
1
2
y21 + y
2
2
) 1
σ
[
y22 +
βσy21 − y22
σ(y21 + y
2
2)
]
which implies that
∂e∗
∂y21
> 0 if βσy21(σ − 1) + y22(1 + βσ) > 0
∂e∗
∂y21
< 0
Firstly, let us comment on the effect of an increase in the endowment of the
young on the exchange rate. It can be seen that there are two effects at play
here. On the one hand, an increase in the endowment of the young increases
savings. Hence, a higher demand for the domestic currency leads to a currency
appreciation. On the other hand, an increase in the endowment of the young
causes a deterioration of the terms of trade, which instead leads the currency to
depreciate. It can be seen that the first effect always dominates whenever the
domestic and the foreign good are substitutes (σ > 1). However, differently
from Lucas (1982), there might be instances in which the sign of the derivative
is still positive when the goods are complements (and it is always positive when
σ = 1).
On the other hand, an increase in the endowment of the old unambiguously
causes a currency depreciation. In fact, this leads to lower savings (hence to
a lower demand for the domestic currency) as well as to a deterioration of the
terms of trade.
4 Local dynamics
To start with, we study the dynamics of the economy around the monetary
steady state. Proposition 1 shows that the nominal exchange rate is pinned
down by next period’s price levels (equation (22)). Hence, it suffices to study
the dynamics of the two prices in order to pin down the equilibrium path of
the nominal exchange rate and the quantity variables.
As it emerged clearly from Proposition 1, this means to study the scalar
difference equation:
F (pt, pt+1) ≡ p1−σt (M + pt+1y2)− βσp1−σt+1 (pty1 −M) = 0, (27)
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and more specifically the local stability of its unique steady state:
p∗ =
M(1 + βσ)
βσy1 − y2 (28)
with p∗ > 0 as long as y1 > β−σy2 ≡ y¯. The superscripts have been dropped
to make the notation less cumbersome.16
Before proceeding, we observe that the price level is a no-predetermined
variable and therefore if p∗ is unstable, then it is locally determinate, while if
it is locally stable, then it is locally indeterminate.
Proposition 3 p∗ is locally determinate if one of the following conditions is
satisfied:
i) y1 ∈ (y¯,∞) and σ ∈ [1,∞)
ii) y1 ∈ (y¯, y˜) and σ ∈ (0, 1);
iii) y1 ∈ (y˜,∞) and σ ∈ [12 , 1);
iv) y1 ∈ (y˜,∞), σ ∈ (0, 12) and βσ ∈ [1− 2σ, 1] or
v) y1 ∈ (y˜, y◦), σ ∈ (0, 12) and βσ ∈ (0, 1− 2σ).
On the other hand, p∗ is locally indeterminate if the following conditions hold:
y1 ∈ (y◦,∞), σ ∈
(
0,
1
2
)
and βσ ∈ (0, 1− 2σ),
while p∗ is nonhyperbolic when y1 = y◦.17 The thresholds of y1 are equal to
y¯ ≡ β−σy2, y˜ ≡ (1 + σβ
σ)y2
(1− σ)βσ and y
◦ ≡ β
σ(1− 2σ)− 1
(βσ + 2σ − 1) y2β
−σ.
Proposition 3 shows the conditions under which the steady state price of
each good is either determinate or determinate, since the dynamics of the two
prices are independent. However, the determinacy or indeterminacy of the sta-
tionary monetary equilibrium will be the consequence of the behavior of both
price levels. Following Proposition 3, it is straightforward to identify situations
in which the stationary monetary equilibrium is locally indeterminate.
Result 1 The monetary steady state is locally indeterminate if the following
conditions hold: σ ∈ (0, 1
2
)
, βσ ∈ (0, 1− 2σ) and y1 ∈ (y◦,∞) for at least one
of the two countries.
16More precisely, we should notice that F (pt, pt+1) = 0 is an (implicit) function when σ > 1 and a
correspondence when σ < 1 (See the Supplementary Material). This finding is well know in the literature
(see Grandmont (1985, p. 1007)). In studying the local dynamics when σ < 1, we will characterise a subset
of the existing equilibria.
17A steady state x∗ of a scalar difference equation xt+1 = F (xt) is non-hyperbolic if |F ′(x∗)| = 1. If a
steady state is non-hyperbolic then the local stable manifold theorem (e.g. Kuznetsov [14], Theorem 2.3
page 50) does not hold, i.e. the local dynamics around x∗ is no more a “good approximation” of the global
dynamics.
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First of all, the indeterminacy of the monetary steady state depends on a
sufficiently low elasticity of substitution and discount factor. The importance
of a strong income effect for indeterminacy to occur is well known in the
overlapping-generations literature.18
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Figure 1: An example of a locally indeterminate monetary steady state
The novelty of this paper is that the indeterminacy of the monetary steady
state is also tied to the relative endowments of the two countries. In fact, this
is the main source of heterogeneity in the model, as preferences are identical
across countries. For indeterminacy to emerge, the endowment of the young
must be higher than the bifurcation point y◦ for at least one country.
For instance, let us consider the following example where the two agents
have the same endowment when old. This implies that the two countries have
the same y◦ as a threshold. Suppose that country 1 has an endowment when
young below the threshold and country 2 above the threshold. We can then
construct an equilibrium around the monetary steady state where p10 = p
1∗
(see left side of Figure 1) while any arbitrary p20 sufficiently close to p
2∗ will
converge to p2∗ according to Proposition 3 (see right side of Figure 1). To
draw the picture, we have chosen parameter values as follows: σ = 0.25,
βσ = 0.4729, M1 = M2 = 1, y12 = y
2
2 = 1, which implies that y
◦ = 14.
Consistently with what described before, the young of country 1 is endowed
with y11 = 19 > y
◦, while the young of country 2 with y21 = 13 < y
◦. Since
there is local indeterminacy in the price p2t , we have also arbitrarily chosen
the initial price level so that it is 1% higher than the steady state value. We
need also to check that money demands are strictly positive, i.e. the inequality
constraints (10)-(11) hold. Observe that these two inequality constraints can
be represented as regions in the space (p2t , p
2
t+1) given the path of the other price
18See e.g. Woodford (1984).
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(p1t = p
1∗ for every t) and the path of the nominal exchange rate which can be
derived from (22) once the paths for the two prices are known. Therefore, we
check numerically that the price sequence {p2t}Tt=0 lies within the region where
both money demands are positive, i.e. not in the grey regions of Figure 1.
We can now comment on the dynamics of the exchange rate. As explained
before, equation (22) pins down the path of the nominal exchange rate once
the paths of the two prices are known:
et =
(
M1 + p1∗y12
M2 + p2t+1y
2
2
) 1
σ
(
p2t+1
p1∗
) 1−σ
σ
(29)
For any given p20, equation (27) will pin down a value for p
2
1, which will then
determine the nominal exchange rate at time 0 through equation (29). Any
given p20 will give rise to a different path for the price of good 2 and hence a
different path for the nominal exchange rate. Once p2t converges to p
2∗, so will
the nominal exchange converge to its long-run value.
The exchange rate is constant only under very special circumstances.
Result 2 In the neighbourhood of the monetary steady state, the nominal ex-
change rate is constant only when the following conditions hold simultaneously:
p10 = p
2
0, y
1
a = y
2
a for every a and M
1 = M2.
Equation (22) shows that even if agents coordinate on an equilibrium where
p10 = p
2
0, the exchange rate is not necessarily constant. In fact, equation (27)
shows that, given the same p0, p1 will not be identical across countries if some
of the fundamentals of the two economies are different. Only if all dimensions
of heterogeneity across countries are completely shut down, the exchange rate
is constant and equal to the steady state value (which, in this case, would be
equal to 1).
5 The “exchange rate disconnect”
The aim of this section is to show that, although the nominal exchange rate is
pinned down by the fundamentals of the economy at the monetary steady state,
persistent fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate around its long-run value
can arise in the absence of shocks to the fundamentals of the economy. Hence,
our model can help to explain why there seems to be a disconnect between the
exchange rate and the fundamentals, especially at shorter horizons.
In particular, we will examine the existence of endogenous periodic cycles
in the nominal exchange rate in section 5.1 , while we will provide conditions
for the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria in section 5.2.
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5.1 Endogenous periodic cycles
In this section, we investigate the dynamics of the economy when the steady
state p∗ is nonhyperbolic, i.e. when
y1 = y
◦, σ ∈
(
0,
1
2
)
and βσ ∈ (0, 1− 2σ)
and therefore dpt+1
dpt
∣∣∣
pt=p∗
= −1 as shown in Proposition 3. The bifurcation
under investigation is a flip bifurcation which may induce two-period cycles in
the price level. In addition, we have chosen y1 as the bifurcation parameter.
For this reason we refer, from now on, to the scalar difference equation (27) as
F (pt, pt+1; y1) = 0.
A preliminary step of our analysis consists in using the Implicit Function
Theorem and observe that, under the assumption Fpt+1(p
∗; y1) 6= 0, i.e. y1 6= y˜,
there exist two positive constants, a and b, and a function f : I → I with
I ≡ (p∗ − a, p∗ + b) such that
F (pt, pt+1; y1) = 0 in I × I ⇔ pt+1 = f(pt; y1)
The strategy to prove that a period-two cycle emerges through a flip bi-
furcation consists in showing that the dynamics of the difference equation
pt+1 = f(pt; y1) is topologically equivalent near pt = p
∗ to the dynamics of
one of the scalar difference equations xt+1 = −(1 + α)xt ± x3t near the steady
state x∗ = 0. In fact, both these difference equations have a dynamic behavior
characterized by a flip bifurcation and, therefore, a period-two cycle in a left
or right neighbourhood of α = 0. If topologically equivalent to one of these
two difference equations, pt+1 = f(pt; y1) will have the same dynamic behavior
in a left or right neighbourhood of y1 = y
◦.
In the following, we will adapt Theorem 4.3 and 4.4 in Kuznetsov [14] to
our framework in order to provide conditions under which the two dynamics
are topologically equivalent near their respective steady state.
Proposition 4 Consider the one-dimensional dynamical system pt+1 = f(pt; y1)
having a nonhyperbolic steady state pt = p
∗ at y1 = y0. Then the following two
conditions are generically satisfied
i) 1
2
(fptpt(p
∗; y◦))2 + 1
3
fptptpt(p
∗; y◦) 6= 0;
ii) fpty1(p
∗; y◦) 6= 0.
For this reason, pt+1 = f(pt; y1) and one of the difference equations xt+1 =
−(1 +α)xt± x3t are locally topologically equivalent near their respective steady
states.
16
Theorem 1 The one-dimensional dynamical system pt+1 = f(pt; y1) has a
flip bifurcation if y1 = y
◦ and two-period cycles emerge for y1 in a right or left
neighborhood of y◦.
Theorem 1 shows that each price can exhibit cyclical behaviour for an open
set of the endowment. Hence, we can conclude that the conditions for the
existence of endogenous business cycles in our framework are the following.
Result 3 Two-period cycles around the monetary steady state exist if the fol-
lowing conditions hold: σ ∈ (0, 1
2
)
, βσ ∈ (0, 1− 2σ) and y1 belongs to the open
set around y◦ as specified by Theorem 1 for at least one of the two countries.
p1t
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1
t+1;y1
1)=0 F(p
2
t ,p
2
t+1;y2
1)=0
p1t+1
p1t+1=p
1
t
p10=p
1
ss p
2
ss
p2tp20
p2t+1
m22,t<0
m11,t<0
p2t+1=p
2
t
Figure 2: An example of a periodic cycle
Figure 2 shows an example where while p1∗ is locally determinate and the
initial price level is exactly the steady state, y21 is such that the price of the
good produced in country 2 exhibits cyclical behaviour. Crucially, the initial
price level in country 2 is not determinate as in country 1 and it could be either
of the two values which arise in the cycle. We consider the same parameter
values as in the indeterminacy example, except for the value of the endowment
of good 2. We check numerically that the money demands remain positive,
doing the same procedure described previously for Figure 1. As it can be
appreciated by looking at Figure 2, the dynamics of the price of good 2 lies
outside the grey regions where the money demands are negative.
Since p20 > p
2∗, then we can define p2H = p
2
t for t = 0, 2, 4.. and p
2
L = p
2
t for
t = 1, 3, 5... The nominal exchange rate also exhibit cyclical behaviour, since
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its dynamics is driven by the cycle in the price of good 2. More specifically:
eL =
(
M1 + p1∗y12
M2 + p2Ly
2
2
) 1
σ
(
p2L
p1∗
) 1−σ
σ
t = 0, 2, 4, ...
eH =
(
M1 + p1∗y12
M2 + p2Hy
2
2
) 1
σ
(
p2H
p1∗
) 1−σ
σ
t = 1, 3, 5, ...
It can be observed that e is high when the expected price of good 2 is high,
which implies that an appreciation of currency 2 is associated with an expected
inflation in the domestic good (which means that in the current period there
is deflation). However, it is important to stress that this is just an example.
As we have observed in Corollary 1, the effect of price changes on the nominal
exchange rate is generally ambiguous when σ < 1. In fact, our paper can
capture the fact that the exchange rate tends also to be disconnected from
other macroeconomic variables such as inflation rates, as well as from the
fundamentals of the underlying economies.
When p1∗ is locally indeterminate, we can construct instead an equilibrium
where p10 6= p1∗. In this case, the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate is
more complex as it depends on whether p10 and p
2
0 start above or below the
steady state, as well as on the strength of the wealth channel relatively to
the price channel. The interesting thing is that the economy (including the
nominal exchange rate) converges to a two-period cycle as p2 converges to p2∗.
Finally, in the case where both prices can exhibit cyclical behaviour, there
also exist periodic equilibria around the monetary steady state.
5.2 Stationary sunspot equilibria
In the previous section, we have shown that there exist deterministic fluc-
tuations of the nominal exchange rate around its long-run value which are
completely unrelated to fluctuations of the fundamentals of the economy.
In this section, we investigate whether fluctuations of the nominal exchange
rate around the monetary steady state can be generated by agents’ beliefs that
prices are stochastic. In a one-currency one-good OLG economy, Azariadis
(1981) has explored the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria, where beliefs
(and, since they are self-fulfilling, equilibrium prices) follow a simple two-state
Markov process. In particular, he showed that gross complementarity between
consumption and leisure and the local indeterminacy of the monetary steady
state are sufficient conditions. Our next aim is to explore the existence of
stationary sunspot equilibria in this framework.
Let us assume that agents believe that the world economy can be in two
states of nature: S = {a, b}. Since we have two agents born in each period,
beliefs can potentially be different between them. Let Πh be a stationary
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transition probability matrix, where the element pih(ij) is the probability that
agent h assigns to state j tomorrow when today’s state is i:
Πh =
(
pih(aa) pih(ab)
pih(ba) pih(bb)
)
(30)
where
∑
s′ pih(ss
′) = 1.
The maximisation problem that each agent faces is:
max
c1h(s),c2h(ss′),mh(s)
c11h(s)
1− 1
σ
1− 1
σ
+
c21h(s)
1− 1
σ
1− 1
σ
+β
∑
s′
pih(ss
′)
[
c12h(ss
′)1−
1
σ
1− 1
σ
+
c22h(ss
′)1−
1
σ
1− 1
σ
]
(31)
subject to the following constraints19:
p1(s)c11h(s) + p
2(s)e(s)c21h(s) +m
1
h(s) + e(s)m
2
h(s) = wh(s)
p1(s′)c12h(ss
′) = m1h(s)
p2(s′)c22h(ss
′) = m2h(s)
Let us define m˜`h(s) ≡ m
`
h(s)
p`(s)
and use the definition of the terms of trade of the
economy (ε(s) ≡ p2(s)e(s)
p1(s)
) to rewrite the above budget constraints as follows:
c11h(s) + ε(s)c
2
1h(s) + m˜
1
h(s) + ε(s)m˜
2
h(s) = w˜h(s) (32)
c12h(ss
′) = m˜1h(s)
p1(s)
p1(s′) (33)
c22h(ss
′) = m˜2h(s)
p2(s)
p2(s′) (34)
where w˜1(s) = y
1
1 and w˜2(s) = ε(s)y
2
1.
In the Appendix, we derive the first-order conditions of the maximisation
problem and show that it involves agent h choosing m˜1h(s) and m˜
2
h(s) which
solve the following two equations:
(
w˜h(s)− m˜1h(s)− ε(s)m˜2h(s)
1 + ε(s)1−σ
)− 1
σ
= β
∑
s′
pih(ss
′)
(
m˜1h(s)
p1(s)
p1(s′)
)− 1
σ p1(s)
p1(s′)
(35)
(
w˜h(s)− m˜1h(s)− ε(s)m˜2h(s)
1 + ε(s)1−σ
)− 1
σ
=
β
ε(s)
∑
s′
pih(ss
′)
(
m˜2h(s)
p2(s)
p2(s′)
)− 1
σ p2(s)
p2(s′)
(36)
We now introduce a definition of stationary sunspot equilibrium.
Definition 3 Given Πh, a stationary sunspot equilibrium is a system of prices
ε(s) ∈ R++ and p(s) ∈ R2++, consumption allocations c1h(s) ∈ R++, c2h(ss′) ∈
R++ and portfolio allocations m˜h(s) ∈ R++ such that:
(i) Agent h maximizes his utility function (31) subject to the budget con-
straints (32), (33) and (34) in every s
19For simplicity, we assume that the endowment of the old is zero.
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(ii)
∑
h(c
`
1h(s) + c
`
2h(s
′s)) = y`1 ∀ s, s′ and ∀ `
(iii)
∑
h m˜
`
h(s) = m˜
`(s) ∀ s, `
(iv) at least one of the following holds: p1(a) 6= p1(b), p2(a) 6= p2(b), ε(a) 6=
ε(b).
(v) 0 < pih(aa), pih(bb) < 1
As it is standard in the literature, our definition excludes the degenerate
cases where the economy either ends up in one state of nature (pih(aa) = 1 or
pih(bb) = 1) or in a two-period cycle (when pih(ab) = 1 and pih(ba) = 1)
20. In our
two-country world, three prices can potentially fluctuate: the nominal prices of
the two goods p1(s) and p2(s) and the terms of trade ε(s). Since e(s) ≡ ε(s)p1(s)
p2(s)
,
then the nominal exchange rate can also fluctuate as a consequence.
Since the general case is quite cumbersome to deal with, we make the fol-
lowing assumptions on agents’ beliefs:
Assumption 1 Agents’ beliefs are specified as follows:
m˜1(a) = m˜1∗ + zn
m˜1(b) = m˜1∗ + zx ⇒ p1(a) 6= p1(b)
m˜2(s) = m˜2∗ ⇒ p2(s) = p2∗
ε(s) = ε∗
pih(ss
′) = pi(ss′) ∀ s, s′
where z, n and x are non-zero numbers.
In other words, agents believe that only the price of good 1 is subject to random
fluctuations while the other prices are those prevailing at the monetary steady
state. In fact, Assumption 1 implies that the price of good 1 fluctuates as
follows:
p1(a) =
M1
m˜1(a)
=
M1
m˜1∗ + zn
p1(b) =
M1
m˜1(b)
=
M2
m˜1∗ + zn
It is also easy to see that fluctuations in the price of one good is sufficient to
generate fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate:
e(a) =
ε∗
p2∗(m˜1∗ + zn)
e(b) =
ε∗
p2∗(m˜1∗ + zx)
Finally, we assume that agents share the same beliefs about the uncertainty
affecting the world economy.
20See Azariadis et al. (1986) for a discussion and for an investigation of the connections between stationary
sunspot equilibria and two-period cycles.
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Proposition 5 Under Assumption 1, stationary sunspot equilibria exist as
long as p1∗ is locally indeterminate.
Proposition 5 shows that, in our open economy setting, it it possible to
construct stationary sunspot equilibria in the neighborhood of the monetary
steady state. If agents believe that the price of one good follows a first-order
Markov process, then the nominal exchange rate would also fluctuate accord-
ingly as beliefs are self-fulfilling. When the price of good 1 goes up (down),
currency 1’s purchasing power falls (increases) hence it depreciates (appreci-
ates). Fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate are purely driven by agents’
beliefs that the real interest rate in one country changes over time with no
relationship to changes in the fundamentals of the economy21.
As in Azariadis (1981), a sufficient condition for stationary sunspot equi-
libria to arise is that the steady state price of the good under consideration is
locally stable or indeterminate. However, the literature has pointed out that
neither the indeterminacy of the steady state nor the complementarity between
the goods are necessary conditions for the existence of stationary sunspot equi-
libria22. While the objective of this paper is to show that fluctuations of the
nominal exchange rate purely driven by agents’ beliefs exist, there is no reason
to believe that our example is somewhat unique or driven by our assumptions
e.g. on preferences.
Let us conclude this section with some welfare considerations. Manuelli
et al. (1990) have also looked at the issue of exchange rate volatility in an
OLG setting. In a one-good two-currencies model with random shocks to the
endowments, they show that for each equilibrium allocation it is possible to
construct arbitrary paths of the nominal exchange rate. Hence, the exchange
rate volatility generated by their model has no welfare implications. In this
paper, there are no shocks to fundamentals and yet the exchange rate can
exhibit some degree of volatility as a result of self-fulfilling beliefs. Sunspot
equilibria are known to be Pareto inefficient from the point of view of ex-
ante expected utility (Peck, 1988). Hence, we can make the argument that
the fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate which arise in this setting are
inefficient.
6 Conclusion
We have provided a theory of exchange rate determination where the value of
the nominal exchange rate at any given period is pinned down by the expected
purchasing power of the two currencies in units of the respective domestic
21We have constructed sunspot equilibria in the case where the price of good 1 fluctuates, but the same
could be done for good 2.
22See e.g. Azariadis (1981) and Woodford (1984).
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goods. At the monetary steady state, the prices of the two goods are a function
of the fundamentals of the respective economies, hence the nominal exchange
rate is itself a function of the fundamentals. Empirical evidence indeed suggests
that the link between exchange rates and fundamentals is stronger at longer
horizons.
Under some conditions on agents’ preferences and endowments, the two
prices can be locally indeterminate around the monetary steady state. It is
enough that one of the two prices is indeterminate for the existence of a con-
tinuum of equilibrium paths of the nominal exchange rate which all converge
to the monetary steady state. The path that will prevail will depend on the
initial prices of the two goods and this gives rise to a different equilibrium al-
location. On the other hand, the fundamentals of the economy are assumed to
be constant. Our framework can then explain why the econometrician strug-
gles to find a correlation between exchange rates and fundamentals at shorter
horizons.
We also show that different types of fluctuations of the nominal exchange
rate around its long-run value can emerge. Firstly, we show the existence
of deterministic cycles in the nominal exchange rates for an open set of the
endowments of the economy. Secondly, we construct stationary sunspot equi-
libria where random fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate arise as a result
of self-fulfilling beliefs. For instance, if we observe that a currency appreciates
but the fundamentals of the underlying economy have not changed, it could
be because agents believe that the purchasing power of the currency goes up.
Therefore, “the exchange rate disconnect” puzzle can be a simple consequence
of people’s “animal spirits”.
Finally, it is worth to spend some words on the conditions under which
these types of fluctuations take place. Our paper has established that some
of the sufficient conditions for sunspots and cycles in the nominal exchange
rate to occur are the same as in one-good, one-currency economies: strong
income effects and low values of the discount factor. However, the literature
has also shown that these are not necessary conditions for either deterministic
cycles or sunspot equilibria to arise in overlapping generations models. Hence,
there is reason to believe that other examples of economies displaying cycles
or sunspot behaviour in the nominal exchange rate can be constructed. We
leave such attempts to future research.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A: First-order conditions
7.1.1 Deterministic economy
The first-order conditions are:
c11h,t : c
1
1h,t
− 1
σ = λ1h,tp
1
t (37)
c21h,t : c
2
1h,t
− 1
σ = λ1h,tp
2
t et (38)
c12h,t+1 : βc
1
2h,t+1
− 1
σ = λ12h,t+1p
1
t+1 (39)
c22h,t+1 : βc
2
2h,t+1
− 1
σ = λ22h,t+1p
2
t+1 (40)
m1h,t : −λ1h,t + λ12h,t+1 = 0 (41)
m2h,t : −etλ1h,t + λ22h,t+1 = 0 (42)
λ1h,t : w1h,t −m1h,t − etm2h,t − p1t c11h,t − p2t etc21h,t = 0 (43)
λ12h,t+1 : m
1
h,t − p1t+1(c12h,t+1 − y12h) = 0 (44)
λ22h,t+1 : m
2
h,t − p2t+1(c22h,t+1 − y22h) = 0 (45)
7.1.2 Stochastic economy
In the sunspot economy, the first-order conditions of the maximisation problem
are:
c11h(s) : c
1
1h(s)
− 1
σ = λ1h(s) (46)
c21h(s) : c
2
1h(s)
− 1
σ = λ1h(s)ε(s) (47)
c12h(ss
′) : βpih(ss′)c12h(ss
′)
− 1
σ = λ12h(ss
′) (48)
c22h(ss
′) : βpih(ss′)c22h(ss
′)
− 1
σ = λ22h(ss
′) (49)
m˜1h(s) : −λ1h(s) +
∑
s′
λ12h(ss
′)
p1(s)
p1(s′)
= 0 (50)
m˜2h(s) : −ε(s)λ1h(s) +
∑
s′
λ22h(ss
′)
p2(s)
p2(s′)
= 0 (51)
λ1h(s) : w˜1h(s)− m˜1h(s)− ε(s)m˜2h(s)− c11h(s)− ε(s)c21h(s) = 0 (52)
λ12h(ss
′) : m˜1h(s)
p1(s)
p1(s′)
− c12h(ss′) = 0 (53)
λ22h(ss
′) : m˜2h(s)
p2(s)
p2(s′)
− c22h(ss′) = 0 (54)
Combine (46) and (47) to obtain:
c21h(s) =
c11h(s)
ε(s)σ
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Plugging the last equation into (52):
c11h(s) =
w˜1h(s)− m˜1h(s)− ε(s)m˜2h(s)
1 + ε(s)1−σ
(55)
which also implies that:
c21h(s) =
w˜1h(s)− m˜1h(s)− ε(s)m˜2h(s)
ε(s)σ(1 + ε(s)1−σ)
(56)
Using (46)-(49), (53), (54), (55) and (56), the two first-order conditions for the
real money balances can be rewritten as:
m˜1h(s) :
(
w˜1h(s)− m˜1h(s)− ε(s)m˜2h(s)
1 + ε(s)1−σ
)− 1
σ
= β
∑
s′
pih(ss
′)
(
m˜1h(s)
p1(s)
p1(s′)
)− 1
σ p1(s)
p1(s′)
m˜2h(s) :
(
w˜1h(s)− m˜1h(s)− ε(s)m˜2h(s)
1 + ε(s)1−σ
)− 1
σ
=
β
ε(s)
∑
s′
pih(ss
′)
(
m˜2h(s)
p2(s)
p2(s′)
)− 1
σ p2(s)
p2(s′)
7.2 Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Using the demand functions (13) and (14), we can
write the market clearing equations for good 1 at time t as follows:
1
p1t
σ
∑
h
wh,t
Ah,t
+
βσ
p1t
σ
∑
h
wh,t−1
Ah,t−1
= y11 + y
1
2 (57)
Using (3) and (14), the demand for currency 1 at time t and t − 1 can be
written as:
m1h,t = β
σp1t+1
1−σwh,t
Ah,t
− p1t+1y12h (58)
m1h,t−1 = β
σp1t
1−σwh,t−1
Ah,t−1
− p1ty12h (59)
Summing across h and assuming that the market for currency 1 clear at any
t, we get upon rearranging:∑
h
wh,t
Ah,t
=
M1 + p1t+1y
1
2
βσp1t+1
1−σ (60)∑
h
wh,t−1
Ah,t−1
=
M1 + p1ty
1
2
βσp1t
1−σ (61)
Finally, plug equations (60) and (61) into (57) and rearrange to obtain (20).
Notice that p1ty
1
1 > M
1 holds since the aggregate consumption of the young of
good 1 is positive.
Since the maximization problem of the initial old is different, we need to
check that this difference equation also holds at t = 0. The market clearing
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condition for good 1 at t = 0 is:
1
p10
σ
∑
h
wh,0
Ah,0
+
M1
p10
+ y12 = y
1
1 + y
1
2
Substituting equation (58) at t = 0, we get:
1
p10
σ
M1 + p11y
1
2
βσp11
1−σ +
M1
p10
= y11
which, upon rearranging, satisfies equation (20) at t = 0.
In a similar way, we can derive the equation describing the dynamics of
good 2. Following the same steps as for good 1, the money market clearing
equation for currency 2 at t can be written as:∑
h
wh,t
Ah,t
=
M2 + p2t+1y
2
2
βσp2t+1
1−σ
et−σ
(62)
Plugging the latter equation at t and t− 1 into the market clearing equations
for good 2, we can derive equation (21).
Finally, the expression for the nominal exchange rate (22) can be found by
combining (60) and (62). Once the paths of the nominal price levels are known,
equation (22) will pin down the path of nominal exchange rate. Hence, the
consumption and the portfolio allocations can be calculated using (93)-(??)
and (6)-(9).
Proof of Corollary 1. Let us calculate the derivative of et with respect to
p2t+1. After a few steps, it can be shown that:
∂et
∂p2t+1
=
1
σ
(
M1 + p1t+1y
1
2
M2 + p2t+1y
2
2
) 1
σ
 −y22M2 + p2t+1y22︸ ︷︷ ︸
wealth channel
− σ − 1
p2t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
price channel

It can be immediately observed that ∂et
∂p2t+1
< 0 is always negative for σ > 1.
This means that currency 2 depreciates when the expected price of good 2
increases. When σ < 1, it is easy to see that the overall effect is ambiguous:
∂et
∂p2t+1
> 0
(
∂et
∂p2t+1
< 0
)
price effect > (<) wealth effect
Proof of Proposition 2.
From (3), stationarity in consumption implies that
p1t+1(c
∗1
2h − y12h) = m1h,t
Aggregating and using the market clearing conditions, we have that
p1t+1
∑
h
(c∗12h − y12h) =
∑
h
m1h,t = M
1
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Therefore, p1 must be constant and therefore pi1 = 0. Looking at (4), we can
similarly show that p2 must be constant and therefore pi2 = 0. At constant
prices, the system plus the two inequality constraints in Proposition 1 rewrite
as (24) and the two inequality constraints in Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3. We investigate the local dynamics around p∗ by
looking at the slope of F (pt, pt+1) at the steady state p
∗:
m ≡ dpt+1
dpt
∣∣∣∣
pt=p∗
= −(1− σ)β
σy2 − (σ + βσ)βσy1
(1 + σβσ)y2 − (1− σ)βσy1 (63)
Under the restriction y1 > y¯ it is easy to show that the numerator is always
negative. On the other hand, the denominator is positive if one of the following
conditions is satisfied: σ ≥ 1 or σ < 1 and y1 < y˜. On the other hand, if σ < 1
and y1 > y˜ the denominator is positive. Observe also that y˜ > y¯ when σ < 1.
Taking into account this information we are now ready to investigate whether
|m| is lower, equal or greater than one.
We need to distinguish two cases:
Case 1: σ ≥ 1 OR σ < 1 and y1 ∈ (y˜, y¯): in this case the steady state is
locally unstable because m > 1 always. In fact
m > 1 ⇔ y1 > y¯
which is always satisfied from what said above.
Case 2: σ < 1 and y2 ∈ (y˜,∞): in this case m < 0 since both the
denominator and numerator of (63) are negative. Therefore, to establish the
local determinacy of p∗, we need to check whether m < −1. Doing that leads
to the following:
m < −1 ⇔ (βσ − 2σβσ − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Γ1
y2 < (2σ + β
σ − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Γ2
βσy1. (64)
Now, Γ1 is always negative. It is straightforward to see that it is so when
1 − 2σ < 0. It continues to be the case when 1 − 2σ > 0 because a positive
sign would require βσ > 1
1−2σ > 1.
Looking now at Γ2, it is clear that Γ2 > 0 always if 2σ−1 ≥ 0. In addition,
Γ2 > 0 if 2σ−1 < 0 and βσ > 1−2σ while Γ2 < 0 if 2σ−1 < 0 and βσ < 1−2σ.
Summing up the sign conditions just found, we have that:
a) Γ1 < 0 and Γ2 > 0 if σ ≥ 12 or if σ < 12 and βσ ∈ (1− 2σ, 1];
b) Γ1 < 0 and Γ2 < 0 if σ <
1
2
and βσ ∈ (0, 1− 2σ)
Clearly, under condition a) and looking at (64) we conclude that p∗ is locally
determinate. On the other hand, condition b) joint with (64) lead to conclude
that p∗ is locally determinate if
y1 <
Γ1
Γ2
β−σy2 ≡ y◦
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and indeterminate otherwise. Finally, we need to verify whether y◦ is greater
or lower than y˜. After some computations, it emerges that y◦ > y˜ because
otherwise β2σ + 2 + 2βσ < 0. Therefore, we conclude that under condition b)
p∗ is locally determinate when y1 ∈ (y˜, y◦) while indeterminate if y2 ∈ (y◦,∞).
Proof of Proposition 4. Conditions i) and ii) are the conditions to check
for the two difference equations to be topologically equivalent according to
Theorem 4.3 in Kuznetsov [14]. More precisely, the conditions in Kuznetsov
[14] are adapted to our framework to take into account that y◦ is generically
different from zero and that the nonhyperbolic steady state of pt+1 = f(pt; y
◦)
is not zero but rather p∗.23
To check these two conditions we need to compute the derivatives fpty1(p
∗; y◦),
fptpt(p
∗; y◦) and fptptpt(p
∗; y◦). This can be done by applying several times the
implicit function theorem to F (pt, pt+1; y1) = 0 in I × I.
We start with:
fpt(pt, y1) = −
Fpt
Fpt+1
= − (1− σ)p
−σ
t (M + pt+1y2)− βσp1−σt+1 y1
p1−σt y2 − βσ(1− σ)p−σt+1(pty1 −M)
(65)
from which we have that fpt(p
∗, y◦) = −1 as shown in Proposition 3.
To verify condition ii) we need to differentiate again with respect to y1
remembering that pt+1 is also a function of y1, i.e. pt+1 = f(pt; y1). Observe
that the last term of (65) can be seen as a function G(pt, pt+1; y1) and then
differentiating both sides of (65) with respect to y1 leads to
fpty1(pt, y1) = Gy1(pt, pt+1; y1) +Gpt+1(pt, pt+1; y1)fy1(pt, y1) (66)
where the last component has been obtained using the chain rule. In particular,
we find that:
fy1(pt, y1) = −
Fy1
Fpt+1
=
βσp1−σt+1 pt
p1−σt y2 − βσ(1− σ)p−σt+1(pty1 −M)
Gy1(pt, pt+1; y1) =
βσp1−σt+1 +G(pt, pt+1; y1)β
σ(1− σ)p−σt+1pt
p1−σt y2 − βσ(1− σ)p−σt+1(pty1 −M)
Gpt+1(pt, pt+1; y1) =
(1− σ)[p−σt+1βσy1 − p−σt y2 −G(pt, pt+1; y1)σβσp−1−σt+1 (pty1 −M)]
p1−σt y2 − βσ(1− σ)p−σt+1(pty1 −M)
substituting these expressions into (100) and evaluating the result at (p∗, y◦)
leads to
fpty1(p
∗, y◦) =
βσp∗2(1−σ)[(2σ − 1)y2 + (1− σ)βσy◦]
[p∗1−σy2 − βσ(1− σ)p∗−σ(p∗y◦ −M)]2 . (67)
23The same kind of modification of the conditions in Theorem 4.3 has been implicitly done in Example
4.1 at page 123 by Kuznetsov [14].
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Details of this derivation can be found in the Supplementary material. Now we
need to show that this cross derivative is generically different from zero. We
observe that this is equivalent to show that generically (2σ−1)y2+(1−σ)βσy◦ 6=
0. To show that, we use the definition of y◦ ≡ βσ(1−2σ)−1
[βσ+2σ−1]βσ y2 and notice that
(2σ − 1)y2 + (1− σ)βσy◦ 6= 0 ⇔ y2
{
(2σ − 1)(σβσ + 2σ − 1)− (1− σ)
[βσ + 2σ − 1]
}
6= 0
which is equal to zero only for a zero measure subset of {(σ, β) : σ ∈
(0, 1
2
) and βσ ∈ (0, 1− 2σ)}. Therefore condition ii) is proven.
We need now to verify condition i). Apply again the chain rule of differ-
entiation on (65) we find that
fptpt(pt, y1) = Gpt(pt, pt+1; y1) +Gpt+1(pt, pt+1; y1)fpt(pt, y1) (68)
where Gpt+1(pt, pt+1; y1) and fpt(pt, y1) were previously found and
Gpt(pt, pt+1; y1) =
(1− σ)[σp−1−σt (M + pt+1y2)−G(pt, pt+1; y1)(p−σt y2 − βσp−σt+1y1)]
p1−σt y2 − βσ(1− σ)p−σt+1(pty1 −M)
. (69)
Therefore:
fptpt(pt, y1) = −(1−σ)G(pt, pt+1; y1)·
2[p−σt y2 − βσp−σt+1y1] + σ[βσp−1−σt+1 (pty1 −M) + p−σ−1t (M + pt+1y2)]
p1−σt y2 − βσ(1− σ)p−σt+1(pty1 −M)
(70)
Let us call the last term on the right hand side Γ(pt, pt+1; y1). Then
fptptpt(pt, y1) = −(1− σ)
[(
Gpt +Gpt+1fpt
)
Γ +
(
Γpt + Γpt+1fpt
)
G
]
(71)
Observe that (71) can be rewritten as
fptptpt(pt, y1) = (1− σ)2GΓ2 − (1− σ)
(
Γpt + Γpt+1fpt
)
G (72)
since
(
Gpt +Gpt+1fpt
)
= fptpt = −(1 − σ)GΓ. Therefore condition i) is
equivalent to check that:
1
6
(1− σ)2Γ∗2 + (1− σ)(Γ∗pt − Γ∗pt+1) 6= 0 (73)
where Γ∗ ≡ Γ(p∗; y0). To show that this relation generically hold, we need to
find Γ∗ and Γ∗pt − Γ∗pt+1 . Substituting pt = p∗ = 1+β
σ
βσy◦−y2M and y1 = y
◦ into Γ
leads to:
Γ∗ =
c0 + c1M
2
p∗y2 − βσ(1− σ)(p∗y◦ −M) (74)
where c0 = 2(y2− βσy◦) 6= 0 and c1 = 2βσ(1+βσ)(y◦+y2)(βσy◦−y2)2 6= 0. On the other hand
it an be shown after long derivations reported in the Supplementary material,
that:
Γ∗pt−Γ∗pt+1 =
p∗
p∗y2 − βσ(1− σ)(p∗y◦ −M)
{
2σ(1− 2σ2 − βσ)
βσ + 2σ − 1 + Γ
∗(1− σ)
[
1 + βσ − βσσM
(
y0 + y2
βσy◦ − y2
)]}
(75)
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Substituting (74) and (75) into (73) allows us to rewrite condition i) as it
follows:
(1− σ)2(c0 + c1M2)2
6
+
(1− σ)(1 + βσ)M
βσy◦ − y2
{
2σ(1− 2σ2 − βσ)
βσ + 2σ − 1
[
1 + βσ
βσy◦ − y2
y2 − βσ(1− σ)
(
y◦ + y2
βσy◦ − y2
)]
M
+(c0 + c1M
2)
[
1 + βσ − βσσM
(
y◦ + y2
βσy◦ − y2
)]}
6= 0
A quick inspection reveals that the left hand side is a 4th degree polynomial
in M and therefore it may have, at most, 4 distinctive zeros unless all the
coefficients of the polynomial are zero. But this is not true since at least the
coefficient of M3 is different from zero. In particular it is equal to σ(1 −
σ)βσ (1+β
σ)3(y◦+y2)
(βσy◦−y2)3 which is generically different from zero. Therefore condition
i) holds.
Proof of Theorem 1. The result is a direct consequence of Proposition 4.
See also Theorem 4.3 and 4.4 in Kuznetsov [14].
Proof of Proposition 5.
We proceed in a number of steps, but the main idea is to adapt the strategy
followed by Woodford (1984) to analyse a one-currency, one-good and one-
agent economy to our framework.
Step 1 - Firstly, we explore the implications of Assumption 1.
To start with, consider that preferences are homothetic (see equation (31)).
This implies that consumption is a constant fraction of wealth. Therefore, we
can write the consumption of the old as follows:
c`2h(ss
′) = f `h(ss
′)w˜h(s)
where f `h(ss
′) is a function of current and future prices. Since preferences, as
specified by the discount factor, the elasticity of substitution and the beliefs
(i.e. the transition probabilities) are the same across individuals, this must
imply that:
f `1(ss
′) = f `2(ss
′)
Hence, the aggregate consumption of the old can be rewritten as follows:
c`2(ss
′) = f `(ss′)
∑
h
w˜h(s)
Let us now define agent h’s share of aggregate consumption as:
θ`h(ss
′) ≡ c
`
2h(ss
′)
c`2(ss
′)
Using the above reasoning, it is easy to show that the share of consumption
only depends on an agent’s share of aggregate wealth:
θ`h(ss
′) =
w˜h(s)∑
h w˜h(s)
⇒ θ`h(ss′) = θh(s)
31
As a consequence, it is independent of the future state and it is also the same
across goods (hence the superscript can be dropped).
We have also assumed that agents believe that the terms of trade are con-
stant. Therefore, agents’ wealth does not fluctuate across states which means
that each agent’s share of aggregate consumption is constant and equal to the
steady state value:
ε(s) = ε∗ ⇒ w˜h(s) = w˜h ⇒ θh(s) = θ∗h
Using the budget constraint of the old, we can rewrite θh as follows:
θ∗h =
c`2h(ss
′)
c`2(ss
′)
=
m˜`h(s)
m˜`(s)
(76)
The additional requirement that p2(a) = p2(b) has another implication:
m˜2(s) = m˜2∗ ⇒ c22(ss′) = c2∗2 ⇒ c21(s) = c2∗1
This is a direct consequence of the aggregated budget constraint of the old for
good 2: constant aggregate money balances imply constant aggregate con-
sumption of the old, hence constant aggregate consumption of the young.
Given that the share of aggregate consumption for each good is also constant,
the individual consumption of good 2 is also constant:
θh(s) = θ
∗
h ⇒ c21h(s) = c2∗1h & c22h(ss′) = c2∗2h
Taking into account all of the above plus the assumption of equal beliefs across
agents, the first-order conditions (35) and (36) can be simplified as follows:(
w˜∗1 − m˜1h(s)− ε∗m˜2∗h
1 + ε∗1−σ
)− 1
σ
= β
∑
s′
pi(ss′)
(
m˜1h(s)
p1(s)
p1(s′)
)− 1
σ p1(s)
p1(s′)
(77)
(
w˜∗1 − m˜1h(s)− ε∗m˜2∗h
1 + ε∗1−σ
)− 1
σ
=
β
ε∗
(
m˜2∗h
)− 1
σ (78)
where
m˜`h(s) = θ
∗
hm˜
`(s) (79)
given equation (76).
Step 2 - Since we have two agents and two states, we have four first-order
conditions for the real money balances of currency 1 (equation (77)), which
can be rewritten as follows:
pi(aa)
1− pi(aa) =
β
(
m˜1h(a)
p1(a)
p1(b)
)− 1
σ p1(a)
p1(b)
−
(
w˜∗h−m˜1h(a)−ε∗m˜2∗h
1+ε∗1−σ
)− 1
σ
(
w˜∗
h
−m˜1
h
(a)−ε∗m˜2∗
h
1+ε∗1−σ
)− 1
σ − β (m˜1h(a))−
1
σ
(80)
pi(bb)
1− pi(bb) =
β
(
m˜1h(b)
p1(b)
p1(a)
)− 1
σ p1(b)
p1(a)
−
(
w˜∗h−m˜1h(b)−ε∗m˜2∗h
1+ε∗1−σ
)− 1
σ
(
w˜∗
h
−m˜1
h
(b)−ε∗m˜2∗
h
1+ε∗1−σ
)− 1
σ − β (m˜1h(b))−
1
σ
(81)
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Since equation (79) establishes a relationship between individual and ag-
gregate real money balances, and the stochastic process for m˜1 is specified by
Assumption 1, the transition probabilities can then be pinned down by the
following equations:
pi(aa)
1− pi(aa) =
β(θ∗hm˜
1(b))−
1
σ m˜1(b)−
(
w˜∗h−θ∗hm˜1(a)−ε∗m˜2∗h
1+ε∗1−σ
)− 1
σ
m˜1(a)(
w˜∗
h
−θ∗
h
m˜1(a)−ε∗m˜2∗
h
1+ε∗1−σ
)− 1
σ
m˜1(a)− β (θ∗hm˜1(a))−
1
σ m˜1(a)
(82)
pi(bb)
1− pi(bb) =
β(θ∗hm˜
1(a))−
1
σ m˜1(a)−
(
w˜∗h−θ∗hm˜1(b)−ε∗m˜2∗h
1+ε∗1−σ
)− 1
σ
m˜1(b)(
w˜∗
h
−θ∗
h
m˜1(b)−ε∗m˜2∗
h
1+ε∗1−σ
)− 1
σ
m˜1(b)− β (θ∗hm˜1(b))−
1
σ m˜1(b)
(83)
where m˜1(a) = m˜1∗ + zw and m˜1(b) = m˜1∗ + zx.
As Woodford (1984), we take the limit for z → 0 of the first-order condi-
tions. If the right-hand sides are positive, then a stationary sunspot equilib-
rium exists as it can supported by positive probabilities. But since both the
numerators and the denominators tends to zero when the economy approaches
the monetary steady state, we apply Hopitaˆl’s rule.
Let us start with the agents born in state a and define:
pi(aa)
1− pi(aa) ≡
fh(z)
gh(z)
After a few steps, it can be checked that:
pi(aa)
1− pi(aa) →
limz→0 f ′h(z)
limz→0 g′h(z)
=
x
n
− S∗h
S∗h − 1
(84)
where
S∗h =
(
w˜∗h−m˜1∗h −ε∗m˜2∗h
1+ε∗1−σ
)− 1
σ
+
θ∗hm˜
1∗
σ(1+ε∗1−σ)
(
w˜∗h−m˜1∗h −ε∗m˜2∗h
1+ε∗1−σ
)−( 1σ+1)
β(θ∗hm˜1∗)
− 1
σ − β
σ
(θ∗hm˜1∗)
− 1
σ
Notice that, at the monetary steady state, the following first-order condition
holds (see equation (77) and (79) for the right-hand side):
w˜∗h − m˜1∗h − ε∗m˜2∗h
1 + ε∗1−σ
=
m˜1∗h
βσ
=
θ∗hm˜
1∗
βσ
We now use some results from section 3, although assuming that y`2 = 0.
Firstly, the aggregate real money balances of good 1 are:
m˜1∗ =
βσy11
1 + βσ
(85)
Hence, we can rewrite the above equation as follows:
w˜∗h − m˜1∗h − ε∗m˜2∗h
1 + ε∗1−σ
=
θ∗hy
1
1
1 + βσ
= θ∗h(y
1
1 − m˜1∗) (86)
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which shows that the consumption of good 1 when young of agent h is nothing
but a share of the savings of good 1.
Secondly, the share of consumption of agent 1 can be rewritten as:
θ∗1 =
w∗1
w∗1 + w
∗
2
=
y11
y11 + ε
∗y21
=
y11
y11 +
(
y11
y21
) 1
σ
y21
=
1
1 + ε∗1−σ
(87)
Plugging (86) and (87) into S∗h, we get that:
S∗h = S
∗ =
(y11 − m˜1∗)−
1
σ +
θ∗1m˜
1∗
σ
(y11 − m˜1∗)−(
1
σ
+1)
β(m˜1∗)−
1
σ − β
σ
(m˜1∗)−
1
σ
(88)
This confirms that beliefs across the two agents born in state a must be the
same for stationary sunspot equilibria to exist:
pi(aa)
1− pi(aa) →
limz→0 f ′(z)
limz→0 g′(z)
=
x
n
− S∗
S∗ − 1 (89)
Next, substituting (85) into (88) we obtain:
S∗ =
σ + βσθ∗1
σ − 1 (90)
Following the same procedure for the agents born in state b, we obtain:
pi(bb)
1− pi(bb) →
limz→0 f ′(z)
limz→0 g′(z)
=
n
x
− S∗
S∗ − 1 (91)
Notice that, when θ → 1, we have that S∗ → m, which is the slope of the
difference equation for good 1 at the monetary steady state24. In fact, when
y2 = 0, m becomes:
m =
σ + βσ
σ − 1
We can now link the existence of sunspot equilibria to the local stability of p1∗
and hence the monetary steady state.
Firstly, we should note that the conditions for the indeterminacy of p1∗ are
slightly different when y2 = 0. To start with, let us check the conditions under
which 0 < m < 1. m > 0 only if σ > 1. However, when σ > 1, m < 1 is
impossible since that would require that 1 + βσ < 0. Let us now consider the
case −1 < m < 0. If σ < 1, then m < 0 always holds. It is easy to check that
m > −1 when βσ < 1 − 2σ. Since β > 0, we would also require that σ < 1
2
.
Therefore, for indeterminacy to occur the conditions on agents’ preferences
remain the same when y2 = 0. However, we do not have any condition on y1.
Finally, it can be verified that for θ1 → 0, then −1 < S∗ < 0 when σ < 12 .
Since S∗ is monotonically decreasing in θ∗1, then −1 < S∗ < 0 for any θ∗1. It
24See the proof of Proposition 3 when y2 = 0.
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is then possible to find a continuum of n and x such that the two ratios of
probabilities are positive.
Step 3 - To conclude, note that as z → 0 the first-order condition for
currency 2 (78) becomes:(
w˜∗h − m˜1∗h − ε∗m˜2∗h
1 + ε∗1−σ
)− 1
σ
=
β
ε∗
(
m˜2∗h
)− 1
σ
which is the first-order condition for currency 2 at the monetary steady state.
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Supplementary material
The imperfect substitutability of currencies
In this section, we show that the assumption that the old can use each currency
only to buy the country-specific good is not enough to guarantee that the two
currencies are not perfect substitutes as stores of value. Suppose that the old
were allowed to readjust their portfolio. The budget constraints of the old
would then be written as follows:
m12h,t+1 + et+1m
2
2h,t+1 = m
1
1h,t + et+1m
2
1h,t
p1t+1(c
1
2h,t+1 − y12h) = m12h,t+1
p2t+1(c
2
2h,t+1 − y22h) = m22h,t+1
But then, the latter constraints can be substituted back into the first con-
straint:
p1t+1(c
1
2h,t+1 − y12h) + p2t+1et+1(c22h,t+1 − y22h) = m11h,t + et+1m21h,t
We now show that the consolidated budget constraint of the old implies that
the two currencies are perfect substitutes as stores of value. Let us define
λ1h,t as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint of the
young (2) and λ2h,t+1 as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the above
constraint for the old. As we are interested in equilibria where both currencies
are demanded in positive quantities, the first-order conditions for the two
currencies would be:
m11h,t : −λ1h,t + λ2h,t+1 = 0
m21h,t : −λ1h,tet + λ2h,t+1et+1 = 0
It is easy to see that the first-order conditions for the two currencies are only
compatible with a constant exchange rate (et+1 = et = e) as in Kareken et al.
(1981). As the two first-order conditions for the currencies are identical, the
portfolio composition cannot be pinned down.
Hence, it is not enough to assume that each currency can only buy the
country-specific good to avoid that the currencies are perfect substitutes as
stores of value. The inability of the old to readjust their portfolio is crucial to
ensure that the two currencies have different rates of return as stores of value.
Derivation of the agents’ portfolios
Combining (37) and (38), we get that:
c21h,t = c
1
1h,t
(
p1t
p2t et
)σ
(92)
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Plugging the latter equation into the budget constraint of the young (43), we
obtain:
c11h,t =
1
p1t
σ
w1h,t −m1h,t − etm2h,t
p1t
1−σ
+ p2t et
1−σ (93)
Substituting (37) and (39) into (41):
p1t
1−σ
σ
(p1t c
1
1h,t)
1
σ
=
βp1t+1
1−σ
σ
(p1t+1c
1
2h,t+1)
1
σ
(94)
Plugging (93) and (44) into (94) and rearranging, we obtain:
m1h,t =
βσp1t+1
1−σ
[w1h,t − etm2h,t]− p1t+1y12(p1t 1−σ + p2t et1−σ)
p1t
1−σ
+ p2t et
1−σ
+ βσp1t+1
1−σ (95)
From (41) and (42), notice that:
etλ
1
2h,t+1 = λ
2
2h,t+1
Substituting (44) and (45) into the latter equation and then (39) and (40), we
get:
eσt (m
2
h,t + p
2
t+1y
2
2)
p2t+1
1−σ =
m1h,t + p
1
t+1y
1
2
p1t+1
1−σ (96)
Notice that (95) and (96) is a system of two equations where the two endoge-
nous variables are m1h,t and m
2
h,t. Solving them simultaneously, we obtain agent
h’s demand functions for the two currencies:
m1h,t =
βσp1t+1
1−σ
[w1h,t + p
2
t+1ety
2
2 ]− p1t+1y12 [p1t 1−σ + p2t et1−σ + βσ(p2t+1et)1−σ]
p1t
1−σ + (p2t et)1−σ + βσp
1
t+1
1−σ + βσ(etp2t+1)1−σ
(97)
m2h,t =
βσp2t+1
−σ
e−σt [w1h,t + p
1
t+1y
1
2 ]− p2t+1y22 [p1t 1−σ + p2t et1−σ + βσp1t+11−σ]
p1t
1−σ + (p2t et)1−σ + βσp
1
t+1
1−σ + βσ(etp2t+1)1−σ
(98)
Conditions under which F (pt, pt+1) = 0 is a function or a correspon-
dence
F (pt, pt+1) = 0 is an (implicit) function when σ > 1 and a correspondence
when σ < 1. To prove this proposition, we begin computing
dpt+1
dpt
= −(1− σ)p
−σ
t (M + pt+1y2)− βσp1−σt+1 y1
p1−σt y2 − (1− σ)βσp−σt+1(pty1 −M)
.
Observe that dpt+1
dpt
is strictly positive for σ > 1 since the numerator is negative
and the denominator is positive. Therefore, F (pt, pt+1) = 0 is a monotonically
increasing function.
37
On the other hand, F (pt, pt+1) = 0 is a correspondence when σ < 1. To
see this, we prove that pt+1 = p
∗ is not the only strictly positive zero of
F (p∗, pt+1) = 0. In particular, we have that
F (p∗, pt+1) ≡ p∗1−σy2pt+1 − βσ
(
y1 + y2
βσy1 − y2
)
Mp1−σt+1 + p
∗1−σM
with F (p∗, 0) = p∗1−σM > 0 and limpt+1→∞ F (p
∗, pt+1) = +∞. In addition,
F (p∗, pt+1) has a unique critical point which is the global minimum. Therefore,
F (p∗, pt+1) = 0 has two zeros, pt+1 = p∗ and another one to the right of it.
We conclude the proof showing that if the steady state respects the necessary
condition for holding money
y2p
σ
t+1 < β
σy1p
∗σ ⇔ pt+1 < β
σy1
y2
p∗ ≡ p˜
then such a condition is also respected by the other zero. In fact, the second
zero would not be admissible if F (p∗, p˜) < 0 but boring calculation shows that
F (p∗, p˜) =
βσy1
y2
[
y2
y1
+
(
βσy1
y2
)− 1
σ
]
> 0
Further details on the derivations in Proposition 4
Regarding Condition ii), we show the steps to arrive to
fpty1(pˆ, y
◦) =
βσpˆ2(1−σ)[y2 − (1− σ)y◦]
[pˆ1−σy2 − βσ(1− σ)pˆ−σ(pˆy◦ −M)]2 . (99)
from
fpty1(pt, y1) = Gy1(pt, pt+1; y1) +Gpt+1(pt, pt+1; y1)fy1(pt, y1) (100)
where as previously observed fpt ≡ G(pt, pt+1; y1) while the derivatives are
fy1(pt, y1) =
βσp1−σt+1 pt
p1−σt y2 − βσ(1− σ)p−σt+1(pty1 −M)
Gy1(pt, pt+1; y1) =
βσp1−σt+1 +G(pt, pt+1; y1)β
σ(1− σ)p−σt+1pt
p1−σt y2 − βσ(1− σ)p−σt+1(pty1 −M)
Gpt+1(pt, pt+1; y1) =
(1− σ)[p−σt+1βσy1 − p−σt y2 −G(pt, pt+1; y1)σβσp−1−σt+1 (pty1 −M)]
p1−σt y2 − βσ(1− σ)p−σt+1(pty1 −M)
The first step is to evaluate these derivatives at the nonhyperbolic steady
state (pˆ, y◦); observe that this means that G(pˆ; y◦) = fpt(pˆ; y
◦) = −1. Then
we have that
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fy1(pˆ, y
◦) = − Fy1
Fpt+1
=
βσ pˆ2−σ
pˆ1−σy2 − βσ(1− σ)pˆ−σ(pˆy◦ −M)
Gy1(pˆ; y
◦) =
βσσpˆ1−σ
pˆ1−σy2 − βσ(1− σ)pˆ−σ(pˆy◦ −M) = σfy1(pˆ, y
◦)pˆ−1
Gpt+1(pˆ; y
◦) =
(1− σ)pˆ−σ[βσy◦ − y2 + σβσ pˆ−1(pˆy◦ −M)]
pˆ1−σy2 − βσ(1− σ)pˆ−σ(pˆy◦ −M)
and then
fpty1(pˆ, y
◦) = fy1(pˆ, y
◦)
{
σpˆ−1 +
(1− σ)pˆ−σ[βσy◦ − y2 + σβσpˆ−1(pˆy◦ −M)]
pˆ1−σy2 − βσ(1− σ)pˆ−σ(pˆy◦ −M)
}
= fy1(pˆ, y
◦)
{
pˆ−σ[(1− σ)βσy◦ + (2σ − 1)y2]
pˆ1−σy2 − βσ(1− σ)pˆ−σ(pˆy◦ −M)
}
Regarding Condition i), we begin with
fptpt(pt, y1) = Gpt(pt, pt+1; y1) +Gpt+1(pt, pt+1; y1)fpt(pt, y1) (101)
where Gpt+1(pt, pt+1; y1) and fpt(pt, y1) were previously found and
Gpt(pt, pt+1; y1) =
(1− σ)[σp−1−σt (M + pt+1y2)−G(pt, pt+1; y1)(p−σt y2 − βσp−σt+1y1)]
p1−σt y2 − βσ(1− σ)p−σt+1(pty1 −M)
. (102)
Combining these derivatives lead to
fptpt(pt, y1) =
(1− σ)[σp−1−σt (M + pt+1y2)−G(pt, pt+1; y1)(p−σt y2 − βσp−σt+1y1)]
p1−σt y2 − βσ(1− σ)p−σt+1(pty1 −M)
+
(1− σ)G(pt, pt+1; y1)[p−σt+1βσy1 − p−σt y2 −G(pt, pt+1; y1)σβσp−1−σt+1 (pty1 −M)]
p1−σt y2 − βσ(1− σ)p−σt+1(pty1 −M)
=
(1− σ){σp−1−σt (M + pt+1y2) +G(pt, pt+1; y1)[2(p−σt+1βσy1 − p−σt y2)−G(pt, pt+1; y1)σβσp−1−σt+1 (pty1 −M)]}
p1−σt y2 − βσ(1− σ)p−σt+1(pty1 −M)
where we observe that fptpt ≡ H(pt, pt+1; y1). We also find that, at the
nonhyperbolic steady state, we have that
fptpt(pˆ, y
◦) =
(1− σ){σpˆ−1−σ(M + pˆy2)− [2(pˆ−σβσy◦ − pˆ−σy2) + σβσ pˆ−1−σ(pˆy◦ −M)]}
pˆ1−σy2 − βσ(1− σ)pˆ−σ(pˆy◦ −M)
=
(1− σ){σpˆ−1(M + pˆy2)− [2(βσy◦ − yˆ2) + σβσ pˆ−1(pˆy◦ −M)]}
pˆy2 − βσ(1− σ)(pˆy◦ −M)
=
(1− σ){(2 + σ)(y2 − y◦βσ) + σpˆ−1M(1 + βσ)}
pˆy2 − βσ(1− σ)(pˆy◦ −M)
and considering that the nonhyperbolic steady state is pˆ = (1+β
σ)M
βσy◦−y2 the last
expression simplifies to
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fptpt(pˆ, y
◦) =
2(1− σ)(y2 − y◦βσ)
pˆy2 − βσ(1− σ)(pˆy◦ −M) 6= 0 (103)
which is always different from zero since y2 − y◦βσ < 0 to guarantee the
existence of a strictly positive steady state.
We now need to compute
fptptpt(pt, y1) = Hpt(pt, pt+1; y1) +Hpt+1(pt, pt+1; y1)fpt(pt, y1). (104)
We find that
Hpt =
(1− σ){−σ(1 + σ)p−2−σt (M + pt+1y2) +Gpt [2(p−σt+1βσy1 − p−σt y2)−Gσβσp−1−σt+1 (pty1 −M)]}
p1−σt y2 − βσ(1− σ)p−σt+1(pty1 −M)
+
(1− σ){G[2σp−1−σt y2 −Gptσβσp−1−σt+1 (pty1 −M)−Gσβσp−1−σt+1 y1] +H[p−σt y2 − βσp−σt+1y1]}
p1−σt y2 − βσ(1− σ)p−σt+1(pty1 −M)
and
Hpt+1 =
(1− σ){σp−1−σt y2 +Gpt+1 [2(p−σt+1βσy1 − p−σt y2)−Gσβσp−1−σt+1 (pty1 −M)]}
p1−σt y2 − βσ(1− σ)p−σt+1(pty1 −M)
+
(1− σ){G[−2σp−1−σt+1 βσy1 −Gpt+1σβσp−1−σt+1 (pty1 −M) +Gσ(1 + σ)βσp−2−σt+1 (pty1 −M)] +Hσβσp−σ−1t+1 (pty1 −M)}
p1−σt y2 − βσ(1− σ)p−σt+1(pty1 −M)
=
(1− σ){σp−1−σt y2 +Gpt+1 [2(p−σt+1βσy1 − p−σt y2)−Gσβσp−1−σt+1 (pty1 −M)]}
p1−σt y2 − βσ(1− σ)p−σt+1(pty1 −M)
+
(1− σ){G[−2σp−1−σt+1 βσy1 + σβσp−1−σt+1 (pty1 −M)(−Gpt+1 +G(1 + σ)p−1t+1 + HG )]}
p1−σt y2 − βσ(1− σ)p−σt+1(pty1 −M)
Let us now evaluate this two derivatives at the nonhyperbolic steady state:
Hpt =
(1− σ){−σ(1 + σ)pˆ−2(M + pˆy2) +Gpt [2(βσy◦ − y2) + σβσ pˆ−1(pˆy◦ −M)]}
pˆy2 − βσ(1− σ)(pˆy◦ −M) +
(1− σ){−[2σpˆ−1y2 −Gptσβσ pˆ−1(pˆy◦ −M) + σβσ pˆ−1y◦] +H[y2 − βσy◦]}
pˆy2 − βσ(1− σ)(pˆy◦ −M)
=
(1− σ){−σ(1 + σ)pˆ−2(M + pˆy2) +Gpt [2(βσy◦ − y2) + 2σβσ pˆ−1(pˆy◦ −M)]}
pˆy2 − βσ(1− σ)(pˆy◦ −M) +
(1− σ){−2σpˆ−1y2 − σβσ pˆ−1y◦ +H[y2 − βσy◦]}
pˆy2 − βσ(1− σ)(pˆy◦ −M)
and
Hpt+1 =
(1− σ){σpˆ−1y2 +Gpt+1 [2(βσy◦ − y2) + σβσ pˆ−1(pˆy◦ −M)]}
pˆy2 − βσ(1− σ)(pˆy◦ −M) +
(1− σ){−[−2σpˆ−1βσy◦ + σβσ pˆ−1(pˆy◦ −M)(−Gpt+1 − (1 + σ)pˆ−1 −H)]}
pˆy2 − βσ(1− σ)(pˆy◦ −M)
=
(1− σ){σpˆ−1y2 +Gpt+1 [2(βσy◦ − y2) + 2σβσ pˆ−1(pˆy◦ −M)]}
pˆy2 − βσ(1− σ)(pˆy◦ −M) +
(1− σ){2σpˆ−1βσy◦ + σβσ pˆ−1(pˆy◦ −M)[(1 + σ)pˆ−1 +H]}
pˆy2 − βσ(1− σ)(pˆy◦ −M)
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